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1 Introduction
The insider-outsider politics has become a growing research topic in comparative political econ-
omy and comparative social policy (Emmeneger et al. 2012; Rueda 2005, 2007). While it is well
known that labor market dualism has profound political implications, how precisely labor market
dualism influences politics is contested in the literature. The rise of nonstandard employment
across countries has drawn much scholarly attention. It is only natural as the labor market
dualism speaks to trade-offs in various policy areas between those who have stable and secure
employment and those who do not. Accordingly, recent studies have suggested sets of interesting
arguments and empirical findings. Theoretical arguments are diverse and empirical findings are
mixed.
Instead of engaging in theoretical debates or providing alternative explanations about the
politics of insider-outsider conflicts, in this paper we take a different path and examine the
case of South Korea (Korea hereafter). We explore the trend and patterns of nonstandard
employment in Korea. Moreover, we examine whether and how labor market outsiders form
distinctive policy preferences, participate in politics, and shape their party preferences. The
Korean case represents a dramatic shift from the age of near-life-time employment to the age
of dualization. The structural break of the labor market came in as a consequence of the 1997
financial crisis and subsequent IMF bail-out. The IMF conditionality then suggested that the
Korean government deregulate labor market and liberalize financial market. Since then the rise
of nonstandard employment has continued. The proportion of the nonstandard employment is
quite high in comparative perspective. While some sociologists and economists have examined
the labor market changes and dynamics and welfare attitudes of outsiders in Korea (Kim and
Ahn 2013; Lee 2012), the political consequences of labor market dualism in Korea has, to the
best of our knowledge, yet to be systematically studied. We provide a first preliminary analysis.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we review the related literature
on the insider-outsider politics. We then examine the trend and patterns of nonstandard employ-
ment in Korea. Next, we introduce empirical set-up for our analysis, followed by the discussions
of the results of our preliminary analysis. The last section concludes with some implications.
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2 Employment Status and the Politics of Dualism
The rising nonstandard forms of employment in many countries has drawn much attention. The
nonstandard forms of employment include fixed-term contracts, involuntary part-time employ-
ment, temporary-agency work, and quasi-dependent freelancing. As the rise of nonstandard
employment is widely observed, the political implications of the rise of nonstandard employment
have been studied in the literature (Burgoon and Dekker 2010; Emmenegger 2009; Emmenegger
et al. 2015; Lindvall and Rueda 2014; Marx 2014; Rueda 2005, 2007).
Comparative political economy and social policy literature have suggested theories and ex-
planations about the issue of voter turnout, policy preferences and party support of labor market
insiders and outsiders. This line of research raises contested issues because, as Marx (2014, p.9)
points out, labor market dualism has been created by reforms with the obvious purpose to increase
employment flexibility while maintaining the status quo for permanent workers (Emmenegger et
al. 2012; Palier and Thelen 2010).
Voter Turnout
In the political behavior literature, class bias in voting has been well known. The low income
group tends to turnout to vote less than their high income counterpart (Leighley and Nagler
2014). We also know that the unemployed turnout to vote much less than those who are employed.
Similarly, the experiences of labor market disadvantages or job insecurity are associated with
political alienation and hence less political involvement (Rosenstone 1982).
Recently, Emmenegger et al (2015) suggest that labor market disadvantage such as unem-
ployment, job insecurity, nonstandard employment tend to affect individual perception of the
responsiveness of the political system to their interests, leading to low levels of political efficacy.
This is in turn associated with abstention from voting or protest voting. Low political efficacy of
outsiders is related to social democratic party’s (or a major center-left party’s) unresponsiveness
to their economic interests. In this sense, this argument is in line with Rueda (2005, 2007). But, it
is interesting to note that Emmenegger et al.’s prediction of party choice is different from Rueda,
who argued that outsiders would support conservative parties when social democratic parties do
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not pay attention to their interest. By a sharp contrast, Emmenegger et al. (2015) argue that
labor market disadvantage may influence pro-redistribution preferences. This counter-argument
expects labor market disadvantage to make outsiders support pro-redistribution and pro-social
policy parties.
In comparative perspective, party systems matter. The configuration of the electoral compe-
tition influences the outsiders’ political behavior. It is reasonable to think that outsiders are more
likely to abstain in party systems in which there is a limited ideological space (Emmenegger et
al. 2015, p.6). If there are no protest parties like radical left-wing or extreme right-wing parties,
outsiders may choose to not participate in voting.
Policy Preferences
Do outsiders have distinct policy preferences? Are their preferences more pro-social policy
than insiders’? Employment status and social policy preferences are important because policy
preferences are a link between employment status and electoral choice. Most studies have sug-
gested that employment status is related to different economic interests, and hence diverse policy
preferences. For instance, Burgoon and Dekker (2010) show that atypical workers are more likely
than labor market insiders to feel economically insecure and this economic insecurity underlies
their strong support for unemployment benefits. Schwander and Hausermann (2013) suggest
risk-based measures of outsiderness and show that the outsiderness is significantly related to
income, upward job mobility, and labor market policy preferences.
Party Preferences and Vote Choice
Recent studies on the electoral behavior of outsiders have provided heated debates over the
political support of outsiders. Rueda (2005, 2007) argues that labor market outsiders have
opposed policy preferences to labor market insiders. Social democratic parties align with insiders,
whereas outsiders support market-liberal right parties as these parties are considered to lean
towards the reduction of employment protection. Lindvall and Rueda (2014) examine Swedish
elections from 1994 to 2010 and find that when Social Democrats did not pay attention to the
interests of outsiders, outsiders either abstained from voting or supported a party further to the
4
left. Their finding suggests that the behavior and strategy of the major left party is crucial for
the electoral choice of outsiders.
Emmenegger (2009) and Marx and Picot (2013) analyze party preferences of nonstandard
workers. Marx and Picot (2013) suggest that nonstandard workers in Germany tend to support
the Green Party as a consequence of the party’s expansionary social policy programs. Marx
(2014) shows that temporary workers across European countries support more expansion of
social policy. These findings are in line with Burgoon and Dekker’s study (2010) suggesting that
temporary workers in Europe show strong support for unemployment protection.
In a different perspective, Marx (2014) suggests that temporary workers tend to hold the
government responsible for their personal economic situation. His argument links the insider-
outsider divide to retrospective economic voting. His analysis of the 2009 German election survey
finds that temporary workers, compared to permanent workers, tend to punish the incumbent
party or to abstain from voting. Marx’s analysis is in line with Bartels (2014) in that they
link employment status or economic crisis with retrospective economic voting, not with partisan
voting.
3 Labor Market and Nonstandard Workers in Korea
Since the 1997 financial crisis and IMF bail-out, Korea underwent labor market deregulation and
financial liberalization. As a consequence, nonstandard employment has increased. The Korean
Statistical Office classifies fixed-term contracts, atypical employment and involuntary part-time
employment into the ‘nonstandard employment’ category.
Figure 1 shows the trend of nonstandard employment in Korea. In 2004, the proportion
of nonstandard employment recorded 37% of the total employment. Since then it has slightly
decreased. In 2014, the figure recorded 32.4% of the total employment. While it is slightly
decreasing in terms of the proportion, the number of nonstandard workers have increased. It
is explained by the fact that the number of total employment has increased (the number of
full-time jobs as well). The Appendix shows a slight different proportion of nonstandard employ-
ment. The figures are different because some institutions and scholars include full-time atypical
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Figure 1: The proportion of nonstandard employment in Korea
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The data are from the Korean Statistical Office, Economically Active Population Survey, each
year.
workers into the category of nonstandard employment in addition to fixed-term, part-time work-
ers, and part-time atypical workers (e.g., Kim 2014). By this classification, the proportion of
nonstandard employment in 2014 recorded 45.4% of the total employment. Nearly a half of the
total employment is nonstandard employment. But, a slightly decreasing trend is the same as
the figures using the Korean Statistical Office classification.
Figure 2 shows the proportion of each nonstandard work type: fixed-term, atypical workers,
temporary workers. Note that the figures at a particular time point do not add up to the total
proportion of nonstandard employment because each work type in Figure 2 may overlap for an
individual. For instance, one individual may have been counted as fixed-term as well as atypical
work. Figure 2 suggests that the proportion of temporary workers has increased since 2004.
It counts about 10.8% of the total employment in 2014, which corresponds to about 2 million
workers. Further, temporary workers face a higher level of job insecurity as they do not expect
to have a secure and stable full-time job.
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Figure 2: Nonstandard employment in Korea: disaggregated by work type
l l l
l
l
l
l l l l l
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Year
Pe
r
c
e
n
t
(%
)
l l l
l l l l l l l
l
l l l l l
l l
l l l
l
24.7 24.2 23.6
22.3
20.4
21.3
19.2 19.7 19.2 18.8 18.7
13.4
12.7 12.6
13.9 13.3 13.9 13.4 13.9 12.9
12.1
11.2
7.4 7 7.4 7.6 7.6
8.7
9.5 9.7
10.3 10.3 10.8
2004.8 2005.8 2006.8 2007.8 2008.8 2009.8 2010.8 2011.8 2012.8 2013.8 2014.8
fixed term
atypical worker
temporary worker
Note: The figures are the proportion of each work type (nonstandard employment) out of the total
employment. The data are from the Korean Statistical Office, Economically Active Population
Survey, each year.
Figure 3 shows a trend of employment status disaggregated by age and sex. In 2014 the
ratio of women among the nonstandard workers was 53.5%. Among men, the number of non-
standard employment is higher than standard employment in early 20s and the older (late 50s
and thereafter). Among women, standard employment reaches its peak at early 30s and then
outnumbered by nonstandard employment. This is mostly because nonstandard jobs are offered
to those women who reentered the labor market after a birth and bearing of a child. In terms of
the ratio between standard and nonstandard jobs, male workers show a U-shaped curve in which
the proportion of nonstandard employment is the lowest at 30s and 40s. Female workers show a
rather different curve in that the proportion of nonstandard employment is the lowest at early
30s and then increase steeply.
Figure 4 shows wage ratio between standard employment and nonstandard employment.
While nonstandard employment reached its peak at 73.5% of hourly wage of standard employ-
7
Figure 3: Employment type, Age, and Sex (2014)
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Figure 4: Wage ratio of nonstandard employment (standard employment=100)
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ment in 2004, the ratio dropped after the Great Recession in 2008 and has not recovered yet.
In 2014, the ratio was 64.3%. This has to do with the fact that an increase in temporary works
(shown in Figure 2) depresses average hourly wage of nonstandard employment. Also, that early
20s and the older group (60s and more) take a huge proportion of nonstandard employment works
as a depressing factor of wage ratio. Or, it may be the case that some high-skilled or professional
standard employees’ wage increased so that the wage gap between standard employment and
nonstandard employment has also increased (Jung 2015).
Do labor market outsiders benefit from social insurance? Figure 5 suggests that an outright
answer is no. While 97% of full-time workers receive public pension, only 33% of nonstandard
workers get public pension. The employers contributes to the national health insurance scheme
for 99% of full-time workers, whereas only 38% of nonstandard employees are provided health
insurance through their workplace. Those who are not provided health insurance through their
workplace get health care coverage via their residential district at a slightly higher rate. Only
38% of nonstandard workers are eligible to receive unemployment insurance, while 85% of full-
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Figure 5: Employment status and Social insurance coverage rate (2014)
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2014.
time workers receive it. Retirement benefits (severance pay) and education and training show a
similar gap between standard and nonstandard employment. This gap in social insurance and
work conditions is quite persistent and we do not observe a trend of decreasing gap in social
insurance provision between insiders and outsiders in Korea.
Figure 6 shows unionization rates among standard workers and nonstandard workers. Union-
ization rate in Korea has decreased since 2008 but it shows an increasing trend for the last three
years. In 2014 unionization rate was 12.5%. More importantly for our purpose, 21% of standard
employees join a union, while only 2.1% of nonstandard employees is unionized in 2014. We can
conjecture that collective action by nonstandard workers is hardly likely given such a low rate of
10
Figure 6: Unionization rate, by employment status (2014)
l
l l l l l l
l l l l l l l l l
l l l l
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Year
o
r
g
an
i
z
at
i
o
n
al
 r
at
e
(%
)
l
l
l
l l l
l l
l l
l l l l l l l
l l l
l l l l l
l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l
11.4
12.4 11.8 11.3 11.3 12.1 12.1
12.7 12.7 12.2 12 11.4 11.3 10.9 11.2 11.5
12.1 12.4 12.3 12.5
22.7
24.3
22.7
21.7 21.8 22.5
22.6 23.3
23.7 23.1
21.9 21.1 20.3 19.9 19.8 20.1 20.6
21.1 20.8 21
2.4 3.1 3.2 2.8 3
3.3 3 3 2.7 2 1.9 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.1 2.2 1.9 2.1
03.8 04.8 05.8 06.8 07.3 07.8 08.3 08.8 09.3 09.8 10.3 10.8 11.3 11.8 12.3 12.8 13.3 13.8 14.3 14.8
unionization
Permanent workers'
Temporary workers'
Note: The data are from the Korean Statistical Office, Economically Active Population Survey,
2014.
unionization. On the other hand, a much higher unionization among standard workers may push
for insiders’ interests at the expense of outsiders’. This conjecture is related to potential insider-
outsider conflicts in Korea. To examine whether outsiders show distinctive policy preferences
and political behavior, we now turn to empirical analysis.
4 Empirical Strategy
This section describes empirical set-up. To examine how employment status affects political
behavior, we make use of the 2009 Korean General Social Survey (KGSS). The survey was con-
ducted using face-to-face interviews with respondents. The respondents were selected randomly
from across the country using the multi-stage area probability sampling method. In particu-
lar, the KGSS includes the questionnaires of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP)
on social inequality. Thus, it includes questions suitable for an empirical analysis of political
behavior of labor market outsiders.
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The dependent variables for this analysis are three-folds. First, to investigate political par-
ticipation of outsiders, we use a question asking respondents whether they have voted in the
2008 general election. We coded 1 if the respondent has voted, 0 otherwise. Second, we examine
whether labor market outsiders have distinct social policy preferences. For redistributive prefer-
ences, we use the following question: “To what extent do you agree or disagree to the following
statement?: It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between
people with high incomes and those with low incomes.” Respondents selected an answer on a
five-point scale, ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree.’ A score of 5 indicates strong
agreement to the statement, which represents a strong support for redistributive policy. To ex-
amine social policy preferences, we use the following question: “The government should provide
a decent standard of living for the unemployed.” Respondents chose an answer on a five-point
scale, where a score of 5 indicates a strong support for unemployment benefits.
Third, we investigate party preferences of outsiders. To do this, we use the question “Cur-
rently which political party do you support most?” In reflecting the Korean party politics, we
grouped the answer as follows: ‘Conservative bloc’ (Liberal Forward Party and Grand National
Party (incumbent)), ‘Democratic Party’ (a major opposition party), ‘Progressive bloc’ (Demo-
cratic Labor Party and New Progressive Party), ‘Center party’ (Renewal of Korea Party), and
‘Non-partisan’ (respondents with no supporting party). In terms of ideological spectrum, from
right to left, parties are located from Conservative bloc - Center party - Democratic Party -
Progressive bloc. Although the party system is quite unstable in that political parties merge and
disappear quite often in Korea, the experts survey of party system in 2004 located in ideological
spectrum as follows (Dalton et al. 2011): Democratic Labor Party (3.2) - Uri Party (3.7) -
Democratic Party (6.3) - United Liberal Democrats (7.2) - Grand National Party (7.3).
The explanatory variable for this analysis is Outsiders. In this category we include ‘tem-
porary employee’ and ‘daily employee’ from the question “What is your employment status?,”
which provides only three categories (the other category is ‘regular employee’). We also include
respondents who are unemployed, currently inactive, and students. This classification approxi-
mates Rueda’s classification of outsiders (Rueda 2005). It should be noted that this classification
falls short of a precise classification based on more detailed information of different employment
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status and work type. As the proportion of self-employed is increasingly high in Korea compared
to other OECD countries, we include a separate category Self-employed in our analyses.
Our empirical analysis includes a battery of control variables considered to affect political
behavior. Income refers to disposable household income and respondents could select from 21
categories. Ideology is a five-point scale of ideological self-placement ranging from ‘very liberal’
to ‘very conservative,’ where a score of 5 refers to ‘very conservative.’ Demographic variables
such as Female, Age and Educational level were also included in the model.
5 Results
This section presents preliminary results of our analysis. We begin by presenting and discussing
employment status and vote participation, followed by discussions of the results of analysis of
policy preferences and party preferences.
5.1 Outsiders and Vote Participation
Are labor market outsiders more likely than insiders to abstain from voting? Table 1 shows
whether outsiders abstained in the 2008 general election more than insiders. We simply distin-
guish between outsiders and those who are either upscale groups or who have secure full-time
jobs. Table 1 shows that 45% of outsiders abstained, while 31% of insiders did not vote. Con-
versely, voter turnout is in a stark contrast between insiders and outsiders (69% vs 55%). This
descriptive analysis suggests that outsiders tended to abstain at a much higher rate than insiders.
To examine the association between employment status and vote participation more sys-
tematically, we estimate a logit model. Covariates include indicator variables for outsider and
self-employed, ideological self-report, age, female, income and education level. We also include
indicator variables representing two regions, Honam and Youngnam, that have been strong sup-
port regions of Democratic Party and Grand National Party.
Table 2 presents the results of analysis. We find that outsiders, compared to insiders, tend
to abstain from voting. Consistent with the existing theories about the employment status and
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Table 1: Outsiders and Voter Turnout
Insiders Outsiders Total
Not voted 221 273 494
(30.7) (44.8) (37.1)
Voted 500 337 837
(69.3) (55.2) (62.9)
Total 721 610 1331
(54.2) (45.8) (100)
Note: Pearson χ2=28.16 (p=0.000). Column percentage points are in parentheses. Data are from
Korean General Social Survey (2009). ‘Outsiders’ include nonstandard workers and unemployed.
Table 2: Employment Status and Vote Participation
Estimates SE
Outsider -0.297** 0.151
Self-employed -0.354* 0.187
Ideology -0.135** 0.066
Age 0.072*** 0.007
Female -0.402*** 0.136
Income 0.031** 0.015
Education 0.135** 0.062
Honam 0.120 0.207
Youngnam 0.343*** 0.149
Constant -2.297*** 0.482
N 1255
Log-likelihood -734.3
Notes : Entries are maximum likelihood estimates and robust standard errors. The dependent
variable is vote participation. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (two-tailed test).
political participation (Leighley and Nagler 2014; Rosenstone 1982), those individuals who have
unstable and insecure jobs shun away from engaging in vote participation. The Korean data
reveal the same pattern. This finding with the Korean case is quite similar to what Mayer (2014)
found from her analysis of the French case. As opposed to the insiders, self-employed tend to
abstain. The results suggest that liberals, the old, male, higher education levels, and coming
from Youngnam province are associated with the likelihood of vote participation. Consistent
with recent findings on the employment status and vote participation (Marx 2014), we find that
those with precarious and insecure jobs are less likely to vote. Our post- estimation simulation
finds that outsiders are 7% point less likely to vote than insiders.
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Table 3: Outsiders and Social Policy Preferences
Insiders Outsiders
Redistribution 3.887 3.980
[3.814, 3.961] [3.911, 4.049]
Unemployment Benefits 4.008 4.135
[3.939, 4.078] [4.068, 4.202]
Notes : Redistributive preferences and preferences for unemployment benefits has 1-5 scale, where
5 refers to ‘strongly agree’ and 1 ‘strongly disagree.’
5.2 Do Outsiders Support Social Policy?
Do Korean labor market outsiders have distinct redistribution and social policy preferences?
Compared to labor market insiders, do outsiders support more redistribution and unemployment
benefits? To examine Korean outsiders’ policy preferences, we first conduct a simple test of
differences of the means between insiders and outsiders, followed by an ordered probit analysis.
Table 3 reports the results of a simple differences of the means test. On 1-5 scale for both
redistribution preferences and unemployment benefits preferences, outsiders show higher levels
of support for redistribution and unemployment benefits. As for redistribution preferences, out-
siders on average show 3.98 (with 95% confidence interval (3.91, 4.05)) while insiders show 3.89
(with 95% confidence interval (3.81. 3.96)). This difference between the two groups is statistically
significant at 90% confidence level (p-value 0.07). The results of the support for unemployment
benefits show similar pattern. Outsiders on average support unemployment benefits on the order
of 4.14 (with 95% confidence interval (4.07, 4.20)). But insiders support level is slightly lower
with 4.0 (with 95% confidence interval (3.94, 4.08)). This difference is statistically significant at
99% confidence level (p-value 0.01). The results reported in Table 3 suggest that Korean labor
market outsiders have stronger support for social policy preferences compared to insiders. This
finding is in line with numerous studies on policy preferences of labor market outsides (Burgoon
and Dekker 2011; Rueda 2005, 2007).
Next, we engage in a more systematic analysis by taking into account other factors that
might affect individual social policy preferences. As policy preferences variables are categorical,
measured on a five-point scale, we estimate the following form of ordered probit model.
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Table 4: Employment Status and Social Policy Preferences
Redistribution Unemployment benefits
Estimates SE Estimates SE
Outsider -0.035 0.074 0.039 0.075
Self-employed -0.029 0.093 -0.081 0.091
Ideology -0.083** 0.035 -0.075** 0.033
Age -0.002 0.003 -0.001 0.003
Female 0.092 0.064 -0.037 0.066
Income -0.009 0.007 -0.020*** 0.007
Education -0.078*** 0.029 -0.067** 0.030
N 1253 1254
Log-likelihood -1571.5 -1505.1
Notes : Entries are ordered probit estimates and robust standard errors. The dependent variable
is policy preferences. Cutpoint estimates are not reported here. *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
(two-tailed test).
Probit[Pr(yi > s)] = Xiγ − ks
where Xi is a vector of independent variables for individual i, γ is a vector of coefficients to be
estimated, and s refers to cut points.
Table 4 shows the results of analysis. Unlike the results reported in Table 3, we do not find
any distinctiveness of outsiders’ social policy preferences relative to labor market insiders. The
estimates for outsiders are not statistically significant, suggesting that outsiders’ preferences are
not distinguishable from insiders’. Individuals’ ideology affects policy preferences. Conservative
individuals tend to support redistribution and unemployment benefits less than liberals. Also,
higher levels of education are associated with lower levels of support for social policy. Once
we take into account ideology, education and other variables, the results suggest that outsiders’
social policy preferences are not distinctive relative to labor market insiders.
5.3 Outsiders and Party Preferences
In the literature on the electoral politics of outsiders, there are competing hypotheses. First, it
has been suggested that outsiders are likely to support a conservative party, provided that a major
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center-left party like social democratic party does not heed to labor market outsiders’ interests
(Rueda 2005, 2007). It is because outsiders would expect labor market deregulations that a
conservative party promote may increase the likelihood of their entry into regular employment.
Second, recent studies have suggested that outsiders’ support would turn towards radical left-wing
parties (Emmenegger et al 2015; Lindvall and Rueda 2014). The reason behind this expectation
is that outsiders are likely to support more pro-redistribution parties. Third, some studies
have argued that outsiders might support extreme right-wing parties (Emmenegger et al 2015).
Outsiders with higher levels of job insecurity would engage in protest voting and their support
would turn towards anti-system extreme right-wing parties.
The ideological spectrum of the party competition in Korea is quite narrow. Although left-
wing parties exist, their electoral leverage is limited. It is due in large part to the electoral
system in Korea. The mixed system with predominantly single-member district system and very
marginal proportion of proportional representation system put small parties in disadvantages.
On the other hand, there is no extreme right-wing parties in Korea. Accordingly, the major
center-right party, Grand National Party, is located at the most right position in ideological
spectrum. In this respect, an analysis of outsiders and party support in Korea can be thought of
as an application of the existing explanations into a context in which party ideological spectrum
is quite limited.
With this context in mind, Table 5 presents a descriptive analysis of the employment status
and party preferences. 25% of outsiders support conservative bloc, while 21% of insiders support
the bloc. Support for a major center-left party, Democratic Party, is similar across the insiders
and outsiders. 16% of insiders support Democratic Party and 15.7% of outsiders support the
party. There is a interesting difference in the support for progressive bloc. Labor market insiders
support progressive bloc more than outsiders do (13.6% vs. 11.3%). Two left-wing parties,
Democratic Labor Party and New Progressive Party, have had a close tie with labor unions.
And union members are predominantly standard workers, i.e., insiders. The proportion of non-
partisans, e.g., those who do not support any party, is virtually the same between insiders and
outsiders. Nearly a half of insiders and outsiders (47.9% vs, 47.7%), respectively, do not have
any political party they support.
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Table 5: Outsiders and Party Preferences
Insiders Outsiders Total
Conservative bloc 147 148 295
(20.8) (25.3) (22.8)
Center bloc 12 2 14
(1.7) (0.3) (1.1)
Democratic Party 113 92 205
(16.0) (15.7) (15.9)
Progressive bloc 96 66 162
(13.6) (11.3) (12.5)
Non-partisan 339 277 616
(47.9) (47.4) (47.7)
Note: Conservative bloc includes Liberal Forward Party and Grand National Party, Center bloc
includes Renewal of Korea Party, and Progressive bloc includes Democratic Labor Party and
New Progressive Party.
Table 6 presents the results of mutlinomial logit analysis. We set center bloc as the comparison
category. The results suggest that outsiders tend to support conservative bloc relative to centre
bloc, to support Democratic Party relative to center bloc, and to be a non-partisan instead of
supporting center bloc. Outsiders are no more likely to support progressive bloc relative to center
bloc. Labor market outsiders in Korea tend to support a major conservative party as well as
major center-left party. Also they tend to choose to be non-partisan. But they are not likely to
support left-wing parties.
6 Conclusion
This paper has shown that labor market dualism has clearly set in Korea. The proportion
of nonstandard employment is quite high, albeit decreasing slightly. The age composition of
nonstandard employment suggests that early 20s and older male workers (after retirement) and
female workers who reentered the labor market after the marriage and child bearing occupy
heavily unstable, nonstandard jobs. Furthermore, the data shows that labor market outsiders
are not adequately protected by social insurance scheme. Nearly invisible unionization rate
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Table 6: Employment Status and Party Preferences
Conservative Democratic Progressive Non-partisan
bloc Party bloc
Outsider 1.972** 1.740** 1.289 1.678**
(0.854) (0.863) (0.866) (0.850)
Self-employed 0.420 0.589 0.244 0.765
(0.676) (0.687) (0.697) (0.665)
Ideology 0.435 -0.202 -0.135 0.134
(0.284) (0.288) (0.290) (0.280)
Age -0.002 -0.034 -0.063 -0.045
(0.031) (0.032) (0.032) 0.031)
Female 0.359 0.408 0.354 0.504
(0.605) (0.614) (0.617) (0.599)
Income -0.005 -0.014 -0.007 -0.016
(0.065) (0.065) (0.066) (0.064)
Education 0.330 0.278 0.242 0.340
(0.263) (0.267) (0.269) (0.260)
Honam -1.150 1.139 0.262 0.020
(1.147) (1.099) ((1.117) (1.096)
Youngnam -0.424 -1.555** -1.061* -1.023*
(0.581) (0.608) (0.600) (0.576)
Constant 0.049 3.239 4.376* 3.611*
(2.214) (2.233) (2.244) (2.186)
N 1224
Log-likelihood -1480.6
Notes : Entries are multinomial logit estimates and robust standard errors. Vote for Renewal of
Korea Party (center party) is the comparison group. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (two-tailed
test).
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among nonstandard employees make matters much worse.
The results of our analysis of the outsiders’ political behavior suggest that outsiders tended
to abstain from voting. They are found to not having distinctively pro-redistribution and pro-
social policy preferences, relative to the insiders. Also, the outsiders tend to support both major
parties of the center-right and center-left, if they do not choose to be a non-partisan.
These findings from the Korean context may suggest that in a system where the party system
is not as diverse as European countries, the electoral behavior of the outsiders would be bound
to be different from what recent studies have found. As Emmenegger et al (2015, p.22) point
out, several factors are likely to be of importance in comparative perspective: party systems,
party strategies, and labor market and welfare state context. Instead of supporting left-wing
pro-redistribution parties, Korean outsiders either support major parties of the center-left or
center-right, or abstain. It would be interesting to examine in what way different electoral
systems affect party systems and party strategies, leading to different electoral behavior of the
outsiders. A comparative study on this topic might be a good research venue.
That Korean outsiders did not form a distinctive pro-redistribution as well as pro-social policy
preferences may be explained by linking numerous studies on the determinants of social policy
and redistribution preferences. Whether it is because of strong tradition of nationalism, or a
long-standing emphasis on economic growth as opposed to redistribution and welfare state, or
lower levels of citizens’ confidence in political institutions, a further study on the outsiders’ policy
preferences might be an interesting research venue. On that note, a comparative study on the
electoral behavior of labor market outsiders within East Asia as well as between Europe and
East Asia might be an important research topic.
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Figure 7: Appendix: The proportion of nonstandard employment in Korea
Year
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Note: The figures are the proportion of nonstandard employment out of the total employment.
The classification is from Kim (2014). The data are from the Korean Statistical Office, Econom-
ically Active Population Survey, each year.
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